the issue of soldiers' suicides not only sheds light on the development of different strands of social science in late nineteenth-/ early twentieth-century Germany, it also suggests the degree to which social scientific debate on the question was unable to escape the politicization that resulted from the wider sociopolitical divisions over militarism in German society.
The emergent social sciences in late nineteenth-century Germany had a strong link to the tradition of the Staatswissenschaften, the sciences of state, which had a strong practical orientation toward facilitating efficient government and administration. 4 Demographic statistical knowledge in all its forms was of considerable importance, partly as an index of the potential military strength of the state. Social science also drew on the empirical work, combining field work, questionnaires, and statistics, of social reform associations in Bismarckian Germany. Both the cameralist and social reform tendencies of early social science in Germany were influenced in the 1860s and 1870s by the field of "Moral Statistics" developed by Adolphe Quetelet.
5 Already in 1864, Adolph Wagner attempted to apply Quetelet's approach to discovering the statistical laws underlying various kinds of human behavior to the analysis of suicide rates. 6 By the 1860s, then, suicide statistics were also seen as an indicator of the moral well-being of a society moving toward a more industrialized economy. Emile Durkheim's study of suicide, first published in French in 1897, made it quite clear that in all European countries for which figures existed, the suicide rate among soldiers was higher than among the civilian population, even allowing for factors such as age and sex. Only in Denmark was the difference inconsiderable. 7 Durkheim's comparative national data, including Prussia, Württemberg, and Saxony, went up to 1890, although the exact timeframes differed from country to country. The Austrian military recorded the highest incidence of suicide relative to the civilian population of military age (10 times as high). The Saxon and Prussian armies had the highest number of suicides per million soldiers after Austria, although the difference between suicide rates in the army and the civilian population in these states was not as high as in Austria or England, but was higher than in France. 8 While Durkheim interpreted the increasing suicide rates in modern society as a byproduct of the extreme growth in individuation in contemporary civilization, loosening the social moorings of the personality, he perceived the opposite trend in the military, in which the individual was subject to an impersonal regime that subordinated the individual personality to a group identity, as in "lower," premodern societies. Durkheim consequently classified suicide in the army as a form of "altruistic" suicide, i.e., the product of an inability to live up to the expected norms of the group. 9 Writing in 1881, in a study published in Vienna, Thomas G. Masaryk had advanced other possible causes for the high rate of suicide among soldiers, despite their youth, good health, and basic material security: homesickness experienced by youthful soldiers torn away from familiar surroundings (perhaps particularly relevant in a multinational, multilingual army like the Austro-Hungarian), greater prevalence of mental illness and dipsomania in the military, fear of punishment, the hardships of military life, and the immoral influences of barracks life. Military life itself was inherently demoralizing. 10 The state of knowledge on the statistical analysis of suicide at the end of the nineteenth century was summed up by Georg von Mayr in his entry in the encyclopedic reference work for the Staatswissenschaften, the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, edited by the Halle Professor Johannes Conrad. Von Mayr's work partly reflected the influence of the "Moral Statistics" school of the 1860s and 1870s on the Staatswissenschaften, although Oberschall has commented that in von Mayr's hands, moral statistics "had become but another form of social bookkeeping."
11 Von Mayr's contribution on suicide statistics presented comparative national data on suicide, and data on age, sex, profession, religious confession, seasonal variation, 12 and the rural or urban background of suicides, as well as data on the means of committing suicide and an attempt at a classification of motives for suicide. 13 Under "profession,"
von Mayr stated that space was lacking to deal with the "special question of military suicides in more detail." He pointed to a recent comparative study (by R. Longuet), which showed that in the period 1875-1887, the Austrian army had the highest suicide rates (122 for 100,000 men), while the German army had 67 suicides per 100,000 men in 1887/1888, compared with 40 in Italy (for 1874-1879) and 29 for France (1872-1889, not including the French army in Algeria and Tunisia, which had a suicide rate of 63 per 100,000). Von Mayr suggested that military suicides might be affected by geographical and seasonal factors, like those of the population as a whole, but did not explain why the rate was so high compared with the rest of the population, aside from a short reference to the age groups involved. Von Mayr noted that the suicide rate had gone down in the German army, to 44 per 100,000 in 1896/1897, and quoted figures showing variation across different army corps, with higher rates in some Prussian and Saxon corps, and lower rates in Bavarian corps.
14 By 1894, the Militär-Wochenblatt observed that the "puzzling" phenomenon of soldiers taking their own lives was becoming the subject of "annually recurring demonstrations in public meetings, the daily press and specialist journals," and was moved to address in its own pages the question of suicide in the Prussian army. 15 This journal, written for a readership consisting largely of army officers, sought to relativize and minimize the issue as much as it could. Undertaking to put the problem in the correct perspective, the military journal began by stressing firstly that suicide increased in all states in step with the progress of cultural development. 16 Secondly, it was noted that peoples of Germanic origin had the strongest tendency toward a higher suicide rate. Within Germany, the ethnic character of Germany's different tribes was also reflected in different suicide rates (highest among the Saxons and their neighbors, decreasing toward the South and West, but increasing again in the North due to the admixture of Danish elements. Slavic elements in the East of Prussia contributed to a lower suicide rate in Prussia's eastern provinces.) 17 Religious confession was found to be a relevant factor, along with race and ethnic origin. Seasonal factors were also statistically relevant.
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Given that Germanic peoples were more likely to have a high suicide rate than others, it was only to be expected that the German and Austrian armies would show a higher suicide rate than other European armies, as statistics from 1876 to 1892 showed they did. 19 The different suicide rates among Saxon, Prussian, and Bavarian army corps, and units from other states, were held to reflect different rates in the population of these states as a whole. 20 After reciting these factors, the Militär-Wochenblatt's author finally conceded that "in all armies the suicide figures are generally higher than among the male population of the same age in the relevant states." In Prussia, the suicide rate was 1.8 times higher than that of the male civilian population from twenty to thirty years of age, while in Austria the rate was 8 times as high in the army. 21 Factors specific to military service would have to be considered, even though the Militär-Wochenblatt stressed that all suicides were identified and counted as such in the Prussian army, to an extent that was not achieved in civilian life, where families had greater opportunities to cover up suicides. 22 One causal factor which the Militär-Wochenblatt was willing to countenance was the high proportion of soldiers who occupied barracks in towns and cities. It was notorious that the suicide rate was higher among the urban population than among the rural population. Soldiers were taken from the healthy milieu of the countryside and exposed to the morbid influences of urban life. Their vulnerability was exacerbated by the fact that most rank-and-file recruits were unmarried, which was in itself a risk factor for suicide. Suicide statistics further revealed that profession had an influence on suicide rates, with the servant class displaying a relatively high suicide rate. Military service could be seen as partly analogous to working as a servant, given the restrictions on personal autonomy. 23 Finally arriving at a comparison of presumed causes of suicide between cases in the Prussian army and those in the civilian population from 1876 to 1890, figures showed that while "tiredness with life" (Lebensüberdruß) and bodily complaints caused only 2% and 1% respectively of deaths in the military, among civilian counterparts the figures were 9% and 7%. There was a far higher rate of suicides caused by mental illness in the civilian population (29% compared with 7% in the army), but nearly one third of suicides in the army were attributed to "fear of punishment," while the closest equivalent in the civilian population was 8% due to "remorse, shame, pangs of conscience." 24 The Militär-Wochenblatt saw the great majority of cases of "fear of punishment" as resulting from "offences against military discipline, that indispensable cornerstone of the solid edifice of our military." 25 It was unavoidable that among the "great mass of those who come out of their military training with unmistakable and universally recognized benefits for their whole spiritual and physical development," there would be some individuals who failed to live up to the demands of their new situation. These were most likely to be "psychologically handicapped, weak-willed, or mentally inferior" specimens, who needed to be identified early and culled from the ranks.
26
The Militär-Wochenblatt sought to refute the "unjustified" opinion that the suicide rate in the military was the result of "inappropriate treatment or even mistreatment of soldiers." Officially, only 1.5% of suicides in the army were diagnosed as the result of "inappropriate treatment or mistreatment." 27 The writer did not, however, draw attention to the very large number of open verdicts: 32% of suicides in the army were listed as the result of "other or unknown causes," compared with 18% of civilian cases, despite the writer's emphasis on the more rigorous investigation in the military.
28
As von Mayr noted, since 1 January 1869, the gathering of statistics on military suicides had been entrusted to the military authorities, instead of the civilian authorities, which had previously been responsible. 29 If suicides were harder to conceal in the army than in civilian life, the army had a degree of control over how the causes of suicide were interpreted. In conclusion, the Militär-Wochenblatt enjoined anyone who wished to reduce the suicide rate in the army to refrain from spreading misleading reports about the topic, out of "ignorance," lest such unsubstantiated rumors themselves have a harmful effect on reluctant young conscripts, preparing "the ground on which the thought of suicide might germinate," even if the actual occasion for such a deed proved to be trivial in itself. 30 Public discussion of the topic should therefore be discouraged, was the tenor of this conclusion. Another view from within the armed forces, but in a more scholarly form, was offered by Rudolf Gruner, Unterarzt with the 2nd Lithuanian Field Artillery Regiment, in his doctoral dissertation for the medical faculty of Berlin University in 1903. Gruner also took explicit objection to the frequent public claims that mistreatment of soldiers was the main cause of the high number of suicides in the army. 31 Like the Militär-Wochenblatt, Gruner began by stressing that suicide rates generally were influenced by cultural development and higher levels of education, and saw a link between ethnoracial influences and different suicide rates in different regions of Germany.
32
He also pointed to the frequency of suicide among the servant class, from which so many soldiers were drawn, and followed the army weekly in suggesting that the higher suicide rate in cities indicated a negative effect on soldiers garrisoned in them (through the exposure of simple country youths to the temptations and distractions of the cities). 33 Age, sex, marital status, and seasonal influences were all identified as relevant factors, although they were hardly factors that distinguished soldiers from their contemporaries in civilian life. 34 Gruner analyzed variations in the suicide rate between different army corps (reflecting different suicide rates in the regions they were drawn from), different arms of the military (infantry, cavalry, artillery, pioneers, Landwehr, etc.), and men of different ranks (noncommissioned officers were twice as likely to kill themselves as privates, figures for officers were not available). 35 Gruner also analyzed means of committing suicide among soldiers (around half used firearms, with hanging the next common cause of death).
36
Like the Miltär-Wochenblatt, Gruner drew on the official statistics on causes of suicide in the German army, taking the figures from 1884 to 1898 (during which the average number of suicides per year was 261, not including officers), and gave the figures his own gloss.
Cause
Percentage Gruner, like the military periodical, insisted that offences against military discipline involved threats to "one of the fundamental conditions for the existence and prestige of a well-functioning army."
38 An injury to a sense of honor, "the cultivation of which is of the highest concern to the army's administration," was seen to be a particularly relevant factor in the case of noncommissioned officers (especially among those degraded to the ranks). 39 Given the youth and usual good health of young army recruits (who had had to pass a medical examination when called up), physical complaints might also be found more frequently among the older noncommissioned officers, although Gruner claimed that the stereotypical assumption that alcoholism was highly prevalent in these circles was an exaggeration. 40 Even compared with the 1.5% of cases given by the Miltär-Wochenblatt as caused by mistreatment, Gruner's 0.04% of cases is a surprisingly miniscule figure (amounting to an average single case a year in the entire German army, out of over 3,900 suicides over a fifteen-year period). The difference between the two sets of figures may arise from a different time frame, in which the suicide rate as a whole was declining (after a peak in the early 1880s), but may also relate to the difference between the Prussian army (the basis of the earlier study), and the German army as a whole. Although Gruner conceded that in a few cases noncommissioned officers from plebeian backgrounds, who had undergone tough training themselves, may have made mistakes with recruits, he emphasized that mistreatment was much less common than liberal circles outside the army might claim, and that the suicide rate in the army was explicable by the same factors as in the general population, with the difference that the army concentrated a large number of unmarried young men in garrison towns and cities, tending to magnify the risk factors. 41 In 1909, Otto von Schjerning considered the suicide rate in the Prussian army from the point of view of military medicine. 42 Von Schjerning cited figures that showed that in the years 1901-1906, despite a mostly steady decline since 1873-1874, the suicide rate in the Prussian army was still higher than in any other European army, with the exception of the Austrian. (Of 10,000 men, 4.2 committed suicide on average in Prussia, compared with 9.9 in the Austro-Hungarian army, 1.2 in the Dutch, 1.3 in the Russian, 1.5 in the Belgian, 1.8 in the French, 3.1 in the Bavarian, and 3.2 in the Italian). 43 Like other military writers on this question, von Schjerning emphasized the operation of general causes of suicide on the troops, denying that the army itself was responsible for suicides, except in so far as military service provided the external occasions for suicides that might have happened in any other environment. 44 Unfortunately, the tendency toward suicide in both the army and the people as a whole was "rooted in the character of the Germanic people." The only way to reduce suicide rates was to strengthen the nation, and steel its character, "the way one equips an army with more and more perfect weapons," so that the nation can meet the demands of its struggle for existence. 45 Other medical authorities and social reformers approached the question of suicide in the military from their own perspectives. Dr. Friedrich Prinzing, a medical practitioner in Ulm, was particularly concerned with alcoholism as a causal factor in suicide. Prinzing had relatively little to say about the suicide rate in the military, which was incidental to the main object of his inquiry. In a chapter surveying the role of profession or sphere of employment in suicide rates, he wrote:
Very many suicides occur in the military and detailed investigations of this have been conducted. Remorse and fear of punishment are the main motives, since the feeling of honor is much intensified and small offences, whether committed out of youthful frivolity or in a state of alcoholic intoxication, are often subject to severe punishment; it must also be emphasized that in no estate is so little consideration paid to the emotions [das Gemüt], although it is precisely in the age soldiers are in that the emotional life plays a great role. 46 Perhaps Prinzing might have derived some reassurance from Gruner's claim that alcohol abuse was not very prevalent in the army's ranks: the rigors of contemporary military service meant that troops had little time to sit in pubs, and "in addition, the common musketeer is seldom in the possession of sufficient riches to permit him to forget the worries of the service in alcoholic intoxication." 47 However, Prinzing did not exempt the military from the general pathology of modern civilization, characterized by a restless striving both to get ahead and to seek amusement and distraction, including in alcohol, all of which created the "neuropathic foundation" on which "psychosis and suicide" flourish, and, to make matters worse, this syndrome was easily inherited by the next generation.
48
Catholic social reformers also concerned themselves with the problem of suicide, tending to see it as a product of the negative side of modern civilization and increasing secular influences. In the introduction to his 1905 investigation of suicide as a social statistical phenomenon, the Catholic writer Hans Rost saw suicides as "a yardstick for the culture and moral strength of a people," indicating whether one lived in an age of "materialist tendencies" or in a time of "pious, reverent, faith in God." Suicide was a product of moral decline. 49 Rost devoted a subsection of his chapter on social factors affecting suicide rates to the military. A number of factors contributed to the high suicide rates (and incidence of attempted suicide, a phenomenon passed over by military writers) in the armed forces, according to Rost, who emphasized more qualitative influences than statistically quantifiable factors: soldiers gave up their individual freedom, and were treated in an impersonal fashion by military discipline; soldiers were torn from their families and often transported to places far from home; the soldier's life was hard and strenuous, and: "There is little room in the barracks for soul and emotional life." Rost added that the educational level manifest in the barracks was such that "mistreatment of soldiers in the coarsest manner, vulgar turns of speech and blasphemous swearwords" were regarded as necessary for the troops' training. Rost cited Masaryk on soldiers' homesickness and the demoralizing influences of barracks life. On the other hand, troops were healthy and had no worries about immediate material security. 50 Rost felt it was difficult to determine "the extent to which militarism is to blame for the frequency of suicides in the army." However, despite some careful qualification, he found the "frequent connection of suicide and military bullying" undeniable. The mistreatment of soldiers, as reported in parliament, sometimes "verged on bestiality." The "charge remains fully upheld that the spirit that exists in the military, the manner of treating people, and other military customs have the majority of soldiers' suicides on their conscience." 51 However, Rost welcomed the significant decline in the number of suicides in the Bavarian army, down from 43 in 1886 to 16 in 1899 (including officers, who were listed in published Bavarian statistics). 52 The suicide rate remained exceptionally high in Austria, which Rost attributed to the persistence of "barbaric punishments, like confinement in stress positions [Krummschließen] and tying up [Anbinden] ." 53 In contrast to military analysts, Rost saw the high proportion of suicides reportedly motivated by "fear of punishment" as pointing to faults in the system of military discipline and training. 54 Rost drew two main conclusions from his brief survey of suicide in the military: religion was one of the strongest factors inhibiting an increase in the suicide rate, and the officer corps needed to ensure that religion was treated with more respect than was normally the case in daily army life, and it was necessary to continue public campaigns, including in parliament, to reduce the incidence of mistreatment of soldiers. A more humane approach to military discipline was called for. 55 Another Catholic view on the incidence of suicide was published by the Jesuit H.A. Krose in essays in the periodical Stimmen aus Maria-Laach. Katholische Blätter. Krose, the foremost exponent of statistical research in the German Catholic church in this period and a founding figure of Catholic social research, drew on Masaryk, Durkheim, and von Mayr (under whom he had studied) in his analysis of the geographical distribution of suicide in nineteenth-century Europe and of the frequency of suicide.
56
Krose recounted the statistics showing the high suicide rate in the military (especially in Austria), but aside from pointing to the official classification of reported motives he refrained from drawing any conclusions about mistreatment of soldiers. 57 Instead of antimilitaristic reflections, Krose represented suicide as ultimately a moral failing of the individual, against which (Catholic) religion formed the strongest protection, and he deplored the deleterious influence of the contemporary press and literature.
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Dieter Riesenberger has recently pointed to a tradition of Catholic antimilitarism in the Kaiserreich. 59 Rost's work, using the term "militarism," frankly condemning the mistreatment of soldiers, and criticizing the disregard for both religion and humanity in the barracks, could be grouped with this tradition, even if the antimilitarist argument only constitutes one part of his study. Krose's work is more cautious and conservative by comparison. Krose was more concerned with using statistics to assess the moral health of a confessional community. More consistently forthright in criticizing the militarism of the Prussian-German army were Social Democrats. The Social Democratic press regularly carried reports of abuses of army recruits, some cases of which were claimed to have resulted in suicide. From the 1870s on, Social Democrat members of the Reichstag pointed to suicides in the army as evidence of the oppressive class nature of the standing army, which set out to break the spirit of any recruits with a healthy rebellious nature.
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The issue of suicide in the army was made the subject of an article in the theoretical and "scientific" journal of the party in 1912. In this article, Salo Drucker, drawing on von Mayr's figures, began with the trend toward a higher suicide rate in "Kulturländern," interpreting it as connected with the conditions of intensified "struggle for existence" under advanced capitalism. 61 Suicide in the army was, Drucker went on to note, considerably more frequent than in civilian life, despite the fact that the army consisted of young men whose health was regularly checked by doctors, and who had no need to worry about their daily bread or shelter. The medical report of the Prussian, Saxon, and Württemberg armies for 1908/09 showed 221 suicides by soldiers in the report year, 0.40 suicides per thousand men. (In addition, there were over 100 recorded unsuccessful suicide attempts.) 62 After analyzing comparative international figures, and differences between enlisted men and noncommissioned officers (officers were left out of the official medical statistics), and between different arms of the military, Drucker proceeded to consider the causes of the high suicide rate in the army. Officially, ten deaths in the previous six years were attributed to "mistreatment and abuse of authority," or as, Drucker would put it, to the abuses of militarism, which were shameful in themselves for the "Kulturstaat Deutschland." Drucker went on to express skepticism about whether the other officially cited causes of soldiers' suicides might not conceal other incidents of abuse, noting the high number of suicides attributed to "fear of punishment." The high number of noncommissioned officers' suicides attributable to this cause was easily explained, in Drucker's view, given the longer-term implications of punishment both for NCOs' careers within the army and for their hopes of a comfortable government-funded job after their military service. 63 Drucker noted that the usual seasonal fluctuation of the suicide rate in the population at large was different in the army, where greater numbers of suicides occurred around large exercises and early in recruits' service, which pointed to causal factors within the army, rather than external factors. 64 He also found the large number of unexplained cases (or inadequately explained-surely all suicides could be said to be "tired of life," as one category of cause was called) remarkable given the degree of control and surveillance to which army recruits were subject. 65 Drucker concluded not only by calling for improved psychiatric attention to recruits, but also by calling for a "thorough change of the whole [system of] militarism," if the number of suicides was to be reduced. "Insults and cases of mistreatment" were responsible for the loss of "hundreds of sons of the people every year." 66 Salo Drucker's article was not really methodologically innovative in that it did not attempt to develop or apply specifically Marxian sociological concepts. His work differed from others in the degree to which it gave uninhibited expression to a critique of the effects of militarism. The connection between the mistreatment of soldiers and the incidence of suicide in the armed forces sometimes arose in the debates in the Reichstag (and in state parliaments) on the treatment of army recruits. 67 While Social Democratic Reichstag deputies did not have a monopoly on expressions of concern over this issue, it was their voices that became predominant in discussions of the topic, especially after around 1900. In February 1883, for example, the left liberal deputy Eugen Richter spoke about the case of a grenadier in Liegnitz who had committed suicide after complaining of abuse in a series of letters to his family. Richter feared that this was not an isolated case, citing a statistical report in the Militär-Wochenblatt that counted 22 cases of suicide in the army, without counting the Bavarian contingents, for the previous November alone. 68 In response, the representative of the Prussian Ministry of War, Lieutenant-General von Verdy du Vernois, objected to the public airing of such cases, while insisting that in no army were men as well treated by their officers as in the Prussian, and the conservative deputy von Kardorff erroneously claimed that suicide rates were considerably higher in other armies, including the British and French armies. 69 In 1885, the Catholic Centre party deputy, Dr Joseph Lingens, used a hearing of the Reichstag's budget commission to request statistics on the incidence of suicides in the Reich army, broken down into corps and regions. Lingens was seeking to determine whether or not the suicide rate in the army was in decline. Lingens was also interested in a breakdown of the figures by religious confession. The War Minister, von Bronsart Schellendorf, readily agreed to furnish the statistics, while claiming that the suicide rates in different army corps simply reflected those of their province of origin. The Saxon military representative to the Reichstag, Major von Schlieben, sought permission from his superiors to cooperate with this request for information. 70 Lingens continued to occupy himself with this topic over a number of years, less out of concern with the mistreatment of recruits, but rather more preoccupied with their spiritual well being. In 1894, Lingens returned to the theme of the significance of religious confession in suicide rates in the army. Describing suicide as a "companion of modern civilization," he noted lower rates in Catholic regions, praised the Prussian army for its increased interest in religious instruction for troops, and attributed the higher suicide rate in the Austrian army to liberal education policies which had allegedly banished religion and crosses from the schools. 71 Increasingly, the Reichstag debates about suicide in the army and the abuse of recruits became dominated by Social Democrats, especially August Bebel, and the increasingly defensive and hostile responses of the military authorities. 72 In February 1896, the Saxon military envoy to Berlin, Count Paul von Vitzthum, reported to the Saxon Ministry of War that Bebel was up to his "tirades" against militarism, "in the usual manner," making the "system of militarism" responsible for the number of suicides in the army. At the same time, Vitzthum noted that Bebel only cited cases from the Prussian army in that speech. Vitzthum was pleased to note that Bebel had to concede that a decline in the number of military suicides was the consequence of a decline in the incidence of cases of ill treatment: a causal nexus that the military authorities otherwise publicly strenuously denied. 73 The following year, in the Reichstag, Vitzthum was faced with specific references by Bebel to suicides in the Saxon army, when Bebel claimed that a single regiment, the 2nd Grenadier Regiment Nr.101, had suffered seven deaths from suicide within two years, figures that Vitzthum was unable to refute. 74 Vitzthum's successor as Saxon military envoy in Berlin, Major Krug von Nidda, reporting on another speech by Bebel attacking abuses in the army, even referred to allegations of "suicide" in quotation marks in his report to his superiors in Dresden. 75 While Prussian and Saxon military authorities had shown a degree of cooperativeness with Centre deputy Lingens's enquiries, their responses to Social Democratic criticism over suicides in the armed forces amounted to displays of denial and stonewalling. In Bavaria, the Social Democrats, notably Adolf Müller, also made use of the Bavarian lower house of parliament (Landtag) to dramatize the issue of mistreatment of soldiers. 76 In Bavaria, unlike in Prussia and other states, courts martial were open to the public, which resulted in a greater degree of transparency when it came to allegations of mistreatment or questions about fatalities in the armed services There also seems to have been an effort by the Bavarian Ministry of War to investigate any accusations raised in the press or to initiate investigations into any matters which might give rise to questions in the Landtag. 77 However, despite the greater transparency that prevailed in Bavaria, the army was still able to influence the reporting of soldiers' suicides, especially when it came to official interpretation of the causes of suicide. Surviving records indicate ways in which an official bias could determine the reporting of causes of suicide. In the case of a noncommissioned officer of the 1st Pioneer Battalion, Max Fuchs, stationed at Ingolstadt, who shot himself, the battalion commander insisted on a report on the "moral and religious condition" of the suicide, and sought to collect evidence on the possibility that the dead man had a sexually transmitted disease, despite the existence of a medical report which found no evidence of such a disease. Fuchs's company commander had to report that a search of his locker showed no evidence to support this theory (and that he had attended church services as required). The most obvious cause for the suicide was that the noncommissioned officer had been caught borrowing money from subordinates and was facing a serious disciplinary charge for this, but the battalion commander seems to have gone to some lengths to find causes other than "fear of punishment."
78 A reference to a separate report on Fuchs's moral and religious deportment was included in the battalion's draft report and was evidently only crossed out when the company commander failed to come up with anything usable. The report still referred to the fear of punishment being aggravated by illness and a disturbed state of mind "presumably" connected with venereal disease, despite the lack of medical or other evidence to support that theory. The report stressed that no third party was at fault in Fuchs's death. 79 Medical speculation about the mental states of soldiers who committed or attempted suicide was still relatively unsophisticated, although the period after this case saw both an increase of psychiatric attention to suicide in the wider population of Bavaria, and the rise of closer collaboration between psychiatrists and the military. Ursula Baumann comments on the increasing tendency to subject attempted suicides to psychiatric examination that instead of seeing suicide as the product of a moral deficiency, it was now possible to see it as the product of individual pathology, which avoided interpreting suicide as an intelligible response to a potentially intolerable situation. 80 The medicalization of suicide coincided with what Martin Lengwiler has described as the partial institutionalization of military psychiatry in the years leading up to 1914, although Lengwiler stresses that the number of properly qualified military psychiatrists remained inadequate by the time of the outbreak of World War I. 81 Such attempts to influence the interpretation of the causes of suicide as the one outlined above were not limited to the efforts of zealous midranking officers; they increasingly reflected official policy. In July 1909, the Bavarian Ministry of War issued a general order to all units regarding suicides in the Bavarian Army. In future, all reports concerning suicides or attempted suicides were required to include details on the financial circumstances of the relevant soldier, and whether there was any history of suicide or mental disturbance in his family. 82 In the following period, even
where there seemed to be a logical proximate causal factor leading to a suicide (such as a soldier facing a serious disciplinary charge or punishment), company officers dutifully set about enquiring about family histories and money problems. On the other hand, canvassing the possibility of mistreatment, even if only to rule it out, was not encouraged. In one instance, for example, the Bavarian 5th Division was censured by the Ministry of War in the following terms: "The finding that there is no suspicion of treatment of Krügel [that was] contrary to regulations did not require such detailed justification on the part of the 5th Division." 83 Even when a soldier left a suicide note, published in the press, in which the reason for the action was given as fear of unjust punishment by a named superior officer, military authorities felt able to disregard such evidence in favor of reports about the soldier's drinking and alleged womanizing ("his disorderly and immoral way of life"), or findings of irregularities in the lining of the brain found after an autopsy. 84 The evidence in the Bavarian military archives indicates a parallel with the findings of Hannes Leidinger's analysis of suicide in the Austro-Hungarian army: "The military was, as a rule, unwilling to countenance mistreatment of recruits, in particular, or of longer-serving soldiers, as a cause of suicides." 85 The result of such policies was that the data used by analysts such as Gruner had already passed through the filter of official military interpretation of the evidence. The incidence of mistreatment and suicide in the army was frequently raised in the Social Democratic press, as part of the general socialist critique of militarism, which was a constant theme of the party's newspapers. Stargardt writes that from the 1890s, Social Democracy "became the only major political force to carry the antimilitarist banner."
86 Already in the early 1870s, not long after the foundation of the Reich in the victory over France, the Neuer Social-Demokrat, for example, often carried reports on the mistreatment of soldiers under the heading "Soldatenelend," including reporting cases of suicide which it linked to abuse of soldiers by superiors. 87 Critical analyses of militarism in party journals like Die Neue Zeit were coupled with broad campaigns in the party press, appealing to the party's mass constituency, against the abuse of recruits. References to such articles in the party press could be multiplied.
Criticism of the army could, however, be hazardous for Social Democratic newspaper editors, and military authorities often reacted to allegations of abuse of soldiers by seeking to lay charges against editors for "insulting the army," which potentially inhibited discussion of the causes of suicide in the army. 
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On one reading of the evolution of the social sciences in Imperial Germany, they can be seen as contributing to increasingly "modern," rationalized, and technocratic forms of social discipline (along with new branches of knowledge such as the development of military psychiatry). 99 The debates over suicide in the military indicate,
however, that where the interests of the traditional military elite were affected, the development of more rationalized and technocratic regimes of the administration of knowledge was potentially subject to the protection of such interests. The military shaped the collection of the statistical information and subjected the data to their own interpretive filter. The polarization of public discourse around the mistreatment of soldiers and suicides in the army, and the legal sanctions brought to bear against Social Democrats whose criticisms went beyond published court martial findings, may well have had an impact on the social scientific discussions of the topic. Apart from Social Democratic writers, and some antimilitarist Catholics, there was a reticence in exploring links between the abuse of soldiers and suicide rates. A causal link is of course hard to demonstrate, but there was clearly pressure from official quarters on social scientists to distance themselves from any suspicion of sympathies for Social Democracy. The case of Robert Michels, who was barred from Habilitation and any teaching post at a German university on the grounds of his activities as a Social Democrat from 1902 to 1907, was well known among German sociologists. 100 As a professor extraordinarius in Breslau, Werner Sombart was also clearly given to understand that it would help his academic career if he demonstrated more distance from Social Democratic views on social questions and took part in propaganda activities for the buildup of the German Navy.
101
The high suicide rate in the Imperial German army was self-evident for any reader of official statistics, even if these presented a selective and arguably sanitized picture of reality by the way in which they classified (or omitted) the presumed causes of suicide. This in itself constituted a challenge for any objective social scientific investigation of the problem. At the same time, the debates over suicides in the military indicated that statistics that were compiled for purposes of enhancing the power and efficiency of the state could also furnish evidence for the state's critics. Public discussion of suicide in the armed forces was highly polarized, with forceful accusations from the left and evasion of the question on the right. Conservative and military writers went to extremes to minimize any link between the mistreatment of soldiers and suicide, while suicides were seen by Social Democrats, pacifists, and some antimilitarist Catholics, as a standing reproach to the culture of the standing army. In this context, social scientists unwilling to be identified with radical critics of the state took a cautious approach or avoided the topic altogether.
Notes
The author thanks the University of Queensland for research leave support which enabled initial research on this topic, and the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, whose support made additional work possible. I also thank two anonymous reviewers for this journal, and the editor, Sabine Hake, for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
